

Under the Global Initiative to Galvanize Political Commitment to International Humanitarian Law (Global IHL Initiative), Australia, Austria, Kenya, the United Arab Emirates and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are pleased to present the:	在“激励对国际人道法做出政治承诺的全球倡议”（简称“国际人道法全球倡议”）下， 澳大利亚、奥地利、肯尼亚、阿拉伯联合酋长国和红十字国际委员会 荣幸呈上：
WORKSTREAM 1	工作领域 1
SECOND STATE CONSULTATION ON PREVENTION GOOD PRACTICES	有关预防工作的美好实践的第二轮国家咨商
<i>For experts from armed forces, relevant ministries in capitals and legal and humanitarian advisers at permanent missions in Geneva</i>	邀请来自武装部队、各国首都相关部委的专家和常驻日内瓦代表团的法律和人道顾问参会
TUESDAY, 25 NOVEMBER 2025	星期二，2025 年 11 月 25 日
9:00–18:00 (UTC+1)	9:00–18:00 (UTC+1)
FORMAT: IN PERSON (ICRC HUMANITARIUM IN GENEVA) AND ONLINE (ZOOM)	会议形式：线下（红十字国际委员会日内瓦人道中心）和线上（ZOOM 网络会议）

Background	背景
In every war, lives are lost, families separated and livelihoods destroyed. Some of the most damaging consequences of war can, however, be averted or mitigated if international humanitarian law (IHL) is respected. Primary responsibility for establishing the laws, institutions, and systems to limit the suffering caused by armed conflict rests with states. They negotiate legal instruments that protect certain categories of people and objects, or that regulate the use of specific weapons, and agree to be legally bound by these instruments by ratifying or acceding to them. States also incorporate IHL rules in domestic laws, policies, and practices; ensure that their armed forces know the law, are trained in it and subject to a strong disciplinary system. They establish and maintain robust disciplinary and judicial systems to prosecute those who commit serious violations of the law. Through bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation, states can ensure that their allies and partners fulfil their IHL obligations.	在每场战争中，都会有生灵涂炭，家庭离散和生计被毁。然而，如果国际人道法得到尊重，就能够避免或减轻战争带来的一些最具破坏性的后果。制定法律、设立机构和建立体系以遏制武装冲突带来的苦难，首要责任在于各国。各国通过谈判达成法律文书，保护特定类别的人群和物体，或规制特定武器的使用，并通过批准或加入法律文书表明同意受其约束；各国还将国际人道法规则纳入国内法律、政策和实践；各国确保其武装部队了解国际人道法、接受相关培训并受到健全的纪律体系约束；各国建立并维系强大的纪律和司法体系，起诉实施严重违法行为的人。通过双边、区域和多边协作，各国能够确保其盟友和合作伙伴遵守各自的国际人道法义务。
For decades, states and other actors have worked to develop and strengthen these systems to uphold IHL obligations. Despite their existence, violations of IHL continue to take place – with a frequency and a severity, and on a scale, that is unacceptable. This workstream seeks to build on global experience in preventing such violations and to explore new approaches. Its aim, ultimately, is to identify good practices, successful strategies and effective methodologies, and thus provide evidence-based guidance for cultivating an environment conducive to respecting IHL.	数十年来，国家及其他参与方一直致力于建立并强化这些体系，以维护国际人道法义务。尽管如此，违反国际人道法的行为却仍在继续发生，且其频率之高、严重程度之深和规模之大，都令人无法接受。本工作领域旨在借鉴预防此类违法行为的全球经验，并探索新的预防方法。最终目标在于识别良好实践、成功策略和有效方法，从而为营造有利于尊重国际人道法的环境提供循证指导。
In the first consultation – on Workstream 1, Prevention Good Practices – states shared their experiences in preventing violations of IHL. They identified a broad range of measures they considered effective in preventing IHL violations. These included training and education; institutional and legal frameworks; regulation of weapons and methods of warfare; military hierarchy and discipline; accountability and enforcement; engagement with civil society and regional networks; and promotion of IHL norms. One of the conclusions reached by the	在第一轮国家咨商期间，各国就——工作领域 1 “预防工作的良好实践”——分享了在预防违反国际人道法行为方面的经验。各国识别出他们认为能够有效预防违反国际人道法行为的广泛措施，包括：培训和教育；制度和法律框架；规制武器和作战方法；军事层级和纪律；问责和执行；民间社会和区域性网络的参与；以及推广国际人道法规范。咨商达成了若干结论，其中一项指出，加强对国际人道法的尊重存在诸多具体途径。

consultation was that there were many concrete ways to strengthen respect for IHL.	
The second and third consultations will build on the shared practices identified in the first consultation, by examining selected themes in greater depth. The second consultation, in particular, aims to look into state practice and analytical work done by the ICRC and others, in order to identify conditions that increase the likelihood of IHL violations during armed conflict. The circumstances in which violations take place are often predictable. They can often be observed as they emerge. By identifying these circumstances – as well as the form they take and what gives rise to them – states can implement measures to address risks pre-emptively or in real time.	第二轮及第三轮咨商将基于第一轮咨商所识别的共同实践，选择若干主题展开更深入的研究。具体而言，第二轮咨商尤其旨在研究各国实践与红十字国际委员会及其他参与方开展的分析工作，以识别可能加剧武装冲突期间违反国际人道法行为的条件。违法行为发生的情形往往是可预测的，其征兆在出现之初就能被察觉。通过识别这些情形——及其形式和产生原因——各国能够采取措施对风险进行预先或实时应对。
On the basis of the first consultation, and work done by the ICRC and other actors, five sets of factors, listed below, were identified as creating the risk of IHL violations being committed. States are invited to consider how these can be monitored and whether systems can be established to track them and respond appropriately.	基于第一轮咨商与红十字国际委员会及其他参与方的工作，识别出下列五组因素可能会带来实施违反国际人道法行为方面的风险。我们邀请各国思考能够如何监控此类因素，以及能否建立体系以对此类因素进行追踪并予以适当应对。
1. Weak or incomplete legal and regulatory frameworks	2. 法律和监管框架薄弱或不健全
Strong domestic legislation is among the most effective safeguards against IHL violations. When laws clearly reflect IHL obligations, they not only bind the armed forces but also provide certainty to commanders, soldiers, and oversight bodies. When that is not the case, compliance with IHL might waver, because of shifting policies or leadership priorities, particularly under operational or political pressure.	强大的国内立法体系是应对违反国际人道法行为最有效的保障之一。当法律条文明确体现国际人道法义务时，这不仅对武装部队具有约束力，也为指挥官、军人和监管机构提供了确定性。否则，政策或领导层重点要务的变化，尤其是在行动或政治压力下，可能就会动摇对国际人道法的遵守。
3. Breakdown of professionalism	4. 丧失职业精神
IHL violations often escalate when there is an erosion of military professionalism. Professionalism is more than a matter of discipline: it underpins lawful conduct in armed conflict. When command structures weaken, training standards decline, or leadership fails to enforce IHL, soldiers may flout their legal and ethical obligations; and may cast aside the	当军队的职业精神削弱时，违反国际人道法的行为往往会加剧。职业精神不仅事关纪律，它更是武装冲突中合法行为的基石。当指挥结构遭到削弱、培训水准下降或领导层未能执行国际人道法时，士兵可能会无视其法律和伦理义务，也可能将通常限制不法行为的职业标准弃置不顾。

professional standards that ordinarily restrain unlawful conduct.	
5. Dehumanization of the enemy and brutalization	6. 将敌人非人化和残酷化
Dehumanizing the enemy, often accompanied by a wider process of brutalization, is another driver of violations. When adversaries or civilian populations are reduced to stereotypes or faceless targets, empathy for them diminishes, paving the way for acts that would otherwise be unthinkable—such as attacking civilians, mistreating detainees, or destroying protected property. Prolonged exposure to violence can normalize cruelty and embed it within operational culture.	将敌人非人化，通常伴随更广泛的残酷化进程，是造成违法行为的另一驱动因素。当敌人或平民居民被简化为刻板印象或面目模糊的攻击目标时，对他们的同理心随之减弱，为实施本来不可想象的行为铺平道路，例如攻击平民、虐待被拘留者或摧毁受保护的财产。长期面对暴力会将残忍常态化，并将其融入作战文化。
7. Lack of transparency and limited openness to scrutiny	8. 透明度不足和对审查开放有限
When military operations lack transparency and external oversight, IHL violations are more likely. Without independent monitoring, effective reporting systems, and accountability mechanisms, misconduct may go unnoticed or unpunished, fostering impunity. A permissive environment not only makes violations more likely to take place but also increases the likelihood of their recurrence. Transparency and scrutiny act as powerful deterrents. A vital safeguard against unlawful conduct is lost when they are absent.	当军事行动透明度不足且缺少外部监督时，更可能会违反国际人道法的行为。如果没有独立的监督、有效的报告体系和问责机制，不当行为就有可能无人注意或不受惩罚，加剧有罪不罚现象。宽松的环境不仅会增加违法行为发生的可能性，也会增加其反复出现的可能性。透明度和审查具有强大的威慑作用，如果缺失，就丧失了遏制不法行为的重要保障。
9. Lack of knowledge of the context	10. 对背景局势缺乏了解
Inadequate grasp of the local context – social, cultural, political, and historical – increases the likelihood of actions that could risk violating IHL. For instance, if a party to a conflict is operating in a society with high levels of gun ownership, and is not aware of this, it might not realize that carrying a weapon does not necessarily indicate that the person is a combatant. Or, if instructions at checkpoints are given in a language not understood by the local population, it could lead to civilians behaving in ways that might be considered ‘hostile’. Forces with inadequate knowledge of the context could also fail to assure the protected status of sites.	对当地的社会、文化、政治和历史情况掌握不足会加剧可能违反国际人道法的行为发生。例如，如果冲突一方在持枪率很高的社会中进行作战但没有认识到这一点，该方可能就无法意识到某人携带武器并不必然表明该人是一名战斗员。或者，如果当地居民听不懂检查站下达指令所用的语言，可能会导致平民所作行为被视为“敌对”行为。部队对背景局势了解不充分也可能导致其无法保证相关地点的受保护地位。

Objectives	目标
This consultation seeks to:	本咨询旨在:
provide an update on the workstream and its progress:	介绍本工作领域的最新情况及进展:
brief participants on the findings of the first consultation reflected in the progress report and on insights gained from subsequent supporting events	向参与方简述进展报告反映的第一轮咨商结论, 以及后续支持活动所贡献的见解
outline the next steps towards identifying the workstream's final recommendations	概述后续工作步骤, 推动本工作领域形成最终建议
create a space for participants to:	为参与方创造空间以:
identify factors that create an environment where violations of IHL are more likely to happen	识别可能加剧违反国际人道法行为发生的环境因素
discuss how to monitor and minimize these risks at the domestic level	讨论如何在国内层面监督这些风险, 并将其最小化
on the basis of the ideas proposed above, share practices and reflections on these ideas, and propose other ideas.	基于上述观点, 分享相关实践与思考, 并提出其他观点。
Next steps	后续工作步骤
The results of this consultation will inform the broader work in the workstream on prevention good practices, and will lead to the formulation of concrete recommendations. One additional thematic consultation will be held in 2026 as part of this workstream, focusing on training and socialization of IHL norms. This will provide an opportunity to reflect on how IHL training can best be organized effectively to socialize the underlying norms of IHL, and an opportunity also to explore how its impact might be measured. This additional thematic consultation will also lead to the formulation of concrete recommendations. All recommendations will be presented in the second quarter of 2026 and will be the object of further discussions among all states.	本轮咨商成果将为“预防工作的美好实践”工作领域更广泛的工作提供参考, 并将促成具体建议的制定。本工作领域将于 2026 年额外举行一次专题咨商, 内容聚焦于国际人道法规范的培训和社会化。这将提供契机, 反思如何能够最为有效地组织国际人道法培训以实现国际人道法基本规范的社会化, 并探讨如何评估其影响力。这一额外的咨商会议也将促成具体建议的制定。所有建议将在 2026 年第二季度发布, 并将成为各国进一步讨论的议题。

Consultations will be complemented with topic-specific workshop and panels. All upcoming supporting events are announced on the Humanity in War website.	特定主题的研讨会和专题讨论会将对咨商予以补充。所有即将举行的支持活动均通过 “战争中的人道” 网站发布。
Participants	参与方
The consultation will be held primarily in person in Geneva. Online participation is also possible.	咨商主要在日内瓦线下举行，也开放线上参会渠道。
The consultation is open to all interested states. There is a strong preference for military experts and representatives from relevant ministries in capitals and at permanent missions in Geneva.	咨商欢迎所有感兴趣的国家参会，尤其欢迎来自各国首都有关部委以及各国常驻日内瓦代表团的军事专家和代表参会。
Other representatives with specific expertise in the subject matter (e.g. members of international organizations, civil society and academia) will also participate upon invitation.	就会议主题事项具备专业知识的其他代表（如国际组织、民间社会和学术界成员）也将应邀参会。
Kindly register no later than 20 November 2025, using this link : https://forms.office.com/e/dYkrBsi8uG	请迟于 2025 年 11 月 20 日前完成注册，注册链接：https://forms.office.com/e/dYkrBsi8uG
Procedure	程序事项
The working languages will be Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish, with simultaneous interpretation.	会议工作语言为阿拉伯文、中文、英文、法文、俄文和西班牙文，会议提供同声传译。
We ask states to kindly limit their statements to four minutes to ensure sufficient time for all participants to take the floor. At the end of each session, and after all participating entities that wish to contribute have done so, states and other participants will be given an opportunity to discuss ideas proposed by others.	请各国将发言时间限制在四分钟内，确保所有参与方都有足够时间发言。在会议每个部分结束时，待有意发言的所有参与方发言完毕后，各国及其他参与方将有机会就他方提出的观点进行讨论。
When preparing their statements, participants are requested to kindly	在准备发言内容时，请各参与方对以下引导性问题进行考虑。

consider the guiding questions provided in the agenda below.	
Given the technical challenges of hybrid meetings, we encourage delegations who are in the room to make their statements in person and in all cases to give their full attention to delegations speaking online.	鉴于线上线下混合会议存在的技术限制，我们鼓励线下参会的代表团作现场发言，并务必在一切情况下认真听取线上代表团的发言。
The inclusive, constructive, non-politicized and solution-oriented nature of the discussions will be maintained throughout the consultation. While participants are encouraged to refer to their state's domestic practice during the consultations, they are asked to kindly refrain from discussing specific contexts or the practice of other states.	咨商全程的讨论将始终保持包容性、建设性、非政治化，并以解决方案为导向。虽然我们鼓励各参与方在咨商会议中提及其本国国内实践，但请避免讨论具体国家和地区或其他国家的实践。
To facilitate interpretation, we invite participants to share a copy of their statements by 23 November 2025, via email to ihlinitiative@icrc.org, with "Prevention Good Practices second consultation" in the subject line. We also encourage participants to send their full written statements by email after the meeting. Unless confidentiality is explicitly requested, these statements will be published on Humanity in War.	为协助会议口译，请参会者于 2025 年 11 月 23 日前将发言稿通过邮件分享至 ihlinitiative@icrc.org，邮件标题栏请注明“预防工作的良好实践工作领域第二轮咨商”。我们也鼓励各参与方会后通过电子邮件提交完整的书面发言稿。除非明确提出保密请求，上述发言稿均将通过“战争中的人道”网站公开发布。
The consultation will be recorded, but the recording will not be made public.	咨商会议将进行录像，但录像不会公开。
Agenda	会议议程
Prevention good practices	预防工作的良好实践
Second Round of Consultations	第二轮咨商
9:00–18:00, 25 November 2025	9:00–18:00, 2025 年 11 月 25 日
ICRC Humanitarium, 17 avenue de la Paix, 1202 Geneva	红十字国际委员会人道中心（17 avenue de la Paix, 1202 Geneva）

<i>* Depending on the number of statements given, all times set out below are subject to change.</i>		*以下所有时间安排将依据发言数量进行调整。	
Registration and coffee / Login and connection	8:30–9:00	现场注册和茶叙/线上登录和接入会议	8:30–9:00
Opening of the meeting and introduction	9:00–9:45	会议开幕、情况概述	9:00–9:45
Session 1: Weak or incomplete legal and regulatory frameworks	9:45–10:45	第 1 部分：法律和监管框架薄弱或不健全	9:45–10:45
Guiding questions		引导性问题	
1. Do you agree that weak or incomplete legal and regulatory frameworks increase the risk of IHL being violated? 2. If you agree, are there specific types of legal or regulatory frameworks, the absence, weakening or inadequacy of which particularly raise the risk of IHL violations? 3. What measures can be taken to track whether the legal and regulatory frameworks identified in question 2 are weakening or incomplete? What would be required to implement this/these measure(s)? (For example, if you believe rules of engagement to be a key framework, you would want to set up some means of alert when clear rules of engagement are not in place at appropriate levels of command. Or, if you believe that it is necessary to have domestic laws that give force to the provisions		5. 贵国是否同意法律和监管框架薄弱或不健全会加剧违反国际人道法的风险？ 6. 如同意，是否存在某些特定类型的法律或监管框架，其缺失、削弱或不足尤其会加剧违反国际人道法行为的风险？ 7. 能够采取哪些措施以追踪了解问题 2 中所识别的法律和监管框架正遭到削弱或本身不健全？实行此类措施需要具备哪些条件？（例如，如果贵国认为交战规则是一个关键框架，贵国可能会希望建立预警，当各指挥层级未具备相应的明确交战规则时发出警示。或者，如果贵国认为有必要制定国内法为国际人道法条款赋予效力，则立法空白预警机制就可能具有相关性。或者，如果贵国认为对交战规则的解释有必要与国际人道法保持一致，则可能需要采取一项措施，在对国际人道法标准所作的法律解释出现突然或无法预料的变化时进行提示。） 8. 针对回答问题 3 时提出的措施，可能需要采取哪些后续应对行动？贵国哪些部门可能需要共同参与应对？其他参与方是否也需要共同参与应对？	
		茶歇	10:45–11:00

of IHL, then a legislative-gap alert could be relevant. Or if you believe that it is necessary for interpretations of rules of engagement to align with IHL, then a measure to flag sudden or unexpected shifts in legal interpretations of IHL standards could be put in place.) 4. What kind of response would be required as a follow-up to the measures suggested under question 3? Which parts of your state would need to be involved in the response? Would other actors need to be involved in the response as well?		
Coffee break	10:45–11:00	
Session 2: Breakdown of professionalism	11:00–12:00	第 2 部分：丧失职业精神
Guiding questions 1. Do you agree that the breakdown of professionalism, or some aspects of it, within the armed forces of a state increases the risk of IHL being violated? 2. If you agree, what elements in your view contribute to the erosion of professionalism? 3. In what ways does the breakdown of professionalism manifest concretely, and how can it be observed? (For example, if you consider that a lack of leadership contributes to the erosion of professionalism, then this might be observed objectively		引导性问题 6. 贵国是否同意一国武装部队内部丧失职业精神，或丧失职业精神的某些方面时，违反国际人道法的风险就会随之上升？ 7. 若同意，贵国认为哪些要素会加剧职业精神的丧失？ 8. 丧失职业精神有哪些具体表现形式，以及如何能够发现这种情况？（例如，如果贵国认为领导力缺失会加剧职业精神的削弱，这一点或许就可以通过长期空缺的指挥官职位数量客观反映出来。或者，如果贵国相信纪律处罚事件的整体增多会体现出职业精神的削弱，则纪律处罚事件数

in the number of command posts that remain vacant for a long period of time. Or, if you believe that an erosion of professionalism would be reflected in an increase in disciplinary action generally, then an increase in disciplinary incidents may signal that professionalism is breaking down.) 4. Based on your response to question 3, what measures do you think can be taken to track the breakdown of professionalism? What would be required to implement this/these measure(s)? Which parts of the state, and what actors, would need to be involved? 5. What kind of response would be required if a breakdown in a certain aspect of professionalism is observed? Which parts of the armed forces or the state would need to be involved in the response? Would other actors need to be involved as well?		量增多就可能表明军队正在丧失职业精神。) 9. 基于贵国对问题 3 的回答, 贵国认为能够采取哪些措施跟进了解丧失职业精神的情况? 实行此类措施需要具备哪些条件? 一国哪些部门及哪些参与方可能需要共同参与其中? 10. 如果发现丧失了某一方面的职业精神, 后续需要如何应对? 武装部队或一国政府的哪些部门可能需要共同参与应对? 其他参与方是否也需要共同参与应对?	
Coffee break	12:00–12:15	茶歇	12:00–12:15
Session 3: Dehumanization of the enemy/Brutalization	12:15–13:15	第 3 部分: 将敌人非人化/残酷化	12:15–13:15
Guiding questions 1. Do you agree that dehumanization of the enemy and/or brutalization of your own forces through prolonged exposure to violence increases the risk of IHL being violated? 2. If you agree, please say what contributes to or directly causes the dehumanization of the enemy and/or brutalization of your own forces? 3. How does dehumanization of the enemy and/or		引导性问题 6. 贵国是否同意, 由于长期面对暴力而将敌人非人化和/或将自身武装部队残酷化会加剧违反国际人道法的风险? 7. 若同意, 请说明哪些要素会加剧或直接导致将敌人非人化和/或将自身武装部队残酷化? 8. 将敌人非人化和/或将自身武装部队残酷化有哪些表现方式? 存在哪些明确征兆? (例如, 可能的表现形式有: 作战单位使用非人化的语言, 或贵国武装部队成员精神健康状况欠佳。) 9. 能够采取哪些措施, 以跟进了解回答上述问题 2 或问题 3 时所提及的一项或多项要素? (例如, 如果贵国相信接触非人化语言会增加违反国际人道法的风险, 则监测社交媒体发布的非人化语言/仇恨言论, 或许能监测非人化风险及由此带来的违反国际人道法的风险是否有所上升。或者, 如果贵国相信暴露于激烈作战行动中会导致残酷化, 则监测各作战单	

brutalization of your own forces manifest itself? What are visible signs of it? (For example, it might manifest itself in the adoption of dehumanizing language within units, or in poorer psychological health among members of your own forces.) 4. What measures can be taken to track one or more of the elements referred to in either question 2 or question 3 above? (For example, if you believe that there is a relationship between exposure to dehumanizing language and an increased risk of IHL violations, then tracking social media for dehumanizing language/hate speech might be a way to track whether the risk of dehumanization and thus IHL violations has gone up. Or, if you believe that there is a relationship between exposure to intense combat operations and brutalization, then tracking the duration of units' deployment in an area of active combat might be one way of tracking increases in the risk of brutalization.) What would be required to implement these measures? Which parts of the state, and what other actors, would need to be involved? 5. What kind of response would be required if dehumanization and/or brutalization is observed through the measure(s) suggested in question 4? Which parts of the state would need to be involved in the response? What other actors could also play a role?		位在交战区域的部署时间，或许能监测残酷化风险上升的情况。）实行此类措施需要具备哪些条件？一国哪些部门及哪些其他参与方可能需要共同参与其中？ 10. 针对回答问题 4 时所提出的措施，如果通过这些措施发现存在非人化和/或残酷化的情况，需要如何应对？一国哪些部门可能需要共同参与应对？还有哪些其他参与方也可能发挥作用？	
Lunch (not provided)	13:15–14:15	午餐（自理）	13:15–14:15
		第 4 部分：透明度不足/对审查开放有限 引导性问题 5. 贵国是否同意透明度不足/对审查开放有限会加剧违反国际人道法的风险？就违反国际人道法的风险而言，是否存在某些特定类型的国内监督措施，相较于其他措施更加重要（例如，内部报告体系、平民投诉体系、一国其他部门的监督）？ 6. 透明度不足和对审查开放不足有何体现方式？存在哪些明确征兆？ 7. 能够采取哪些措施，以监督透明度/对审查开放程度，从而监测违反国际人道法的风险？实行此类措施需要具备哪些条件？一国哪些部门及哪些其他参与方可能需要共同参与其中？ 8. 如果回答上述问题 3 时所提出的措施显示有必要，如何提高透明度/对审查开放水平？武装部队或一国政府的哪些部门可能需要共同参与其中？其他参与方是否也需要共同参与其中？	14:15 – 15:15
		茶歇	15:15–15:30

Session 4: Lack of transparency/Openness to scrutiny Guiding questions 1. Do you agree that a lack of transparency/limited openness to scrutiny increases the risk of IHL being violated? Are there particular types of measures for domestic oversight that can be more important than others, in relation to the risk of IHL violations (e.g. internal reporting systems, complaints systems for civilians, oversight provided by other parts of the state)? 2. How can the lack of transparency and openness to scrutiny manifest itself? What are its visible signs? 3. What measures can be taken to monitor transparency/openness to scrutiny, with a view to tracking the risk of IHL violations? What would be required to implement these measures? Which parts of the state, and what other actors, would need to be involved? 4. How could the level of transparency/openness to scrutiny be raised, should the measure(s) in question 3 above indicate that this is required? Which parts of the armed forces or the state would need to be involved in the response? Would other actors need to be involved as well?	14:15– 15:15	第 5 部分：对背景局势缺乏了解 引导性问题 6. 贵国是否同意对背景局势了解不充分会加剧违反国际人道法的行为发生？是否存在尤其需要了解的任何背景局势和环境特征？ 7. 若同意，请贵国说明，是否在某些特定情形下这一点更为突出？ 8. 对背景局势缺乏了解有何表现形式？存在哪些明确征兆？ 9. 能够采取哪些措施，以跟进了解回答上述问题 3 时所提及的一项或多项要素？实行此类措施需要具备哪些条件？ 10. 一国能够采取哪些措施，确保其武装部队充分了解当地的背景局势？	15:30– 16:30
Coffee break	15:15– 15:30	茶歇	16:30– 16:45
Session 5: Lack of knowledge of the context Guiding questions 1. Do you agree that not knowing enough about the context increases the	15:30– 16:30	第 6 部分：其他因素 引导性问题 是否存在加剧违反国际人道法风险的其他因素？这些因素有何表现形式？存在哪些明确征兆？可能存在哪些应对方式？哪些参与方需要共同参与应对？	16:45– 17:45
		总结发言和后续工作步骤	17:45– 18:00

likelihood of actions that risk violating IHL? Are there any characteristics of the context and environment that are particularly important to know? 2. If you agree, please say whether there are specific circumstances in which this is more salient? 3. How does insufficient knowledge of the context manifest itself. What are visible signs of it? 4. What measures can be taken to track one or more of the elements referred to in question 3 above? What would be required to implement these measures? 5. What measures can a state take to ensure its armed forces have an adequate understanding of the local context?		
Coffee break	16:30– 16:45	
Session 6: Additional factors	16:45– 17:45	
Guiding question Are there any other factors that raise the risk of IHL violations? How do they manifest themselves? What are their visible signs? What are some possible responses to this? What actors would be involved in the response?		
Concluding remarks and next steps	17:45– 18:00	

